Tag Archives: Lubrizol

Berkshire Buys Lubrizol

So Berkshire has announced its latest acquisition—Lubrizol (LZ).

In its latest 10-K, Lubrizol describes its primary business—lubricant additives (primarily for engine and driveline lubricants):

“We believe we are the market leader in lubricant additives, and we intend to remain the leader by continuing to invest in this business. Our Lubrizol Additives segment’s growth strategy is to continue to optimize our product mix while closely aligning production capacity with product demand. Challenging market forces and conditions continue to influence the Lubrizol Additives segment. A key factor is the low long-term global growth rate for this market, which we believe is in the range of approximately 1% to 2% per year.”

Pre-tax operating income in 2010 was $1B, on $5.4B in revenues—both records for the company. At an estimated purchase price of $9.7B (which assumes $0.7 net long-term debt), Berkshire is paying 10x pre-tax OI. And almost 4x shareholder equity.

Lubrizol’s gross profit percentage for 2010 was 33.1%, which also appears to be an all-time high. (2008 marked the five year low, at 22.3%; 2006 saw 24.6%.)

Lubrizol has earned very good returns on shareholder capital (excluding special items) in recent years. Its average return on shareholder equity for 2010 was 34.4%, also an all-time high.

I will not extend the theme, but the drift is clear: this purchase price is not a bargain for Berkshire, given Lubrizol’s results over the last five years. Any margin of safety then must lie solely in expected (and highly likely, one would presume) future performance. At minimum, I would think, Berkshire must expect revenues and margins to remain close to their 2010 performance, for at least the majority of the next decade.

Berkshire was not willing to offer LZ shareholders the option of Berkshire stock (as in the Burlington deal), so that should indicate Buffett’s thoughts on each’s relative value.

Longer term, LZ’s future revenues and earnings may face risks—if, e.g., 1) improved engine design increases drain intervals, 2) new vehicle purchases slow and stagnant, or 3) input costs (particularly petroleum) increase faster than expected.

Clearly, I’m missing some important piece of this puzzle.

Disclosure: I hold shares of Berkshire Hathaway.

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